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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a one sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation. 
The  two  inputs  are  two  types  of  skilled  labor:  “engineering,”  which  exerts  a  positive 
externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a 
marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both 
types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the 
country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy  from the 
(inefficient) free-market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if 
the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a 
consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration 
“lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law. 
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1. Introduction 
Substantial research has led to a consensus that human capital is a key determinant of both 
economic  efficiency  and  social  welfare.
1  Ever  since  the  influential  contribution  of  Lucas 
(1988), much of the literature has underscored the role of the externality effect of human 
capital in accounting for its crucial importance as a factor of production.
2 Since human capital 
is inherently heterogeneous, it stands to reason that different types of human capital confer 
different human capital externalities which, in turn, bear upon economic performance. Indeed, 
with both micro data and macro data, the empirical literature highlights the importance of the 
heterogeneity of human capital. For example, Willis (1986) and Grogger and Eide (1995) 
underscore  the  importance  of  the  heterogeneity  of  human  capital  in  determining  labor 
earnings.  Krueger  and  Lindahl  (2001)  survey  evidence  showing  that  the  heterogeneity  of 
human  capital  helps  explain  variation  in  cross-country  economic  growth.  Nonetheless, 
theoretical analyses of heterogeneous human capital are relatively rare. Notable exceptions 
include Iyigun and Owen (1998) and Iyigun and Owen (1999), who emphasize the importance 
of  both  “professional  human  capital”  and  “entrepreneurial  human  capital”  in  economic 
development. They show how economies that have too little of either  type of human capital 
might be hindered in their pursuit of economic growth. 
In this paper, we seek to complement the received literature by developing a model of 
heterogeneous  human  capital  with  a  particular  emphasis  on  the  impact  of  international 
migration on individuals' incentive to acquire different types of human capital. We contribute 
to the received literature in two specific respects. First, we allow various types of human 
capital to differ significantly in terms of their  externality  effect. Second, we consider the 
differential international “portability” of different types of human capital in an open economy 
setting, where the migration of one type of human capital is possible whereas that of another 
is not. 
Our presumption is that individuals who possess the types of human capital that have 
high social returns (strong externality effects) in a developing country, are more likely to land 
a rewarding job offer in a developed country than individuals who possess the types of human 
capital that have low social returns (weak externality effects) in the developing country. The 
                                                 
1 For example, see Becker (1964), Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992), Weil (2005), and the literature reviewed 
therein. 
2 Among others, recent important contributions on the externality effect of human capital include Acemoglu 
(1996), Black and Henderson (1999), Glaeser and Saiz (2004), Moretti (2004), Ciccone and Peri (2006), and 
Giordani and Ruta (2011). 2 
 
intuition underlying this thinking is quite simple: while the types of human capital that confer 
high  social  returns  and  associated  high  externality  effects,  such  as  engineering,  are  fairly 
universal, the types of human capital that confer lower social returns in a developing country, 
such as law, are not. The individuals with the former types of human capital in a developing 
country have a much better chance of working in a developed country.  
The “architecture” of our paper is as follows. To begin with, we study the formation 
and allocation of heterogeneous human capital in a closed developing economy. Efficient 
resource  allocation  would  assign  skilled  workers  in  optimal  proportions  to  occupations 
requiring different types of human capital. However, without government intervention or any 
prospect of migration, the different degrees of positive externality of different types of human 
capital entail a market failure in terms of achieving efficient allocation of productive human 
capital. This failure arises from too few individuals choosing to invest in the types of human 
capital  that  generate  high  externality  effects  and  low  private  returns  (for  example,  pure 
science). In addition, from the perspective of social welfare, all the individuals choose to 
acquire too little human capital. 
We  then  examine  how  the  prospect  of  migration  may  correct  this  allocation 
inefficiency. When the economy is open, selective migration can substantially enhance social 
welfare: inefficient resource allocation can be mitigated when the expected private returns to 
individuals who accumulate human capital with high social returns are raised by conferring 
upon them a better chance of migrating and working in a richer, technologically advanced 
country. We show that the prospect of migration for these individuals increases human capital 
accumulation, redistributes talent in a socially desirable way, increases the ex-ante (before 
migration occurs) payoffs of all groups of workers, and, under certain sufficient conditions, 
increases welfare - even that of the workers who responded to the opportunity to migrate but 
ended up not migrating. 
Our  analysis  complements  recent  research  on  the  “beneficial  brain  drain,”  which 
demonstrates  that  a  policy  of  controlled  migration  from  a  developing  country  encourages 
individuals there to accumulate more human capital than they would have chosen to do in the 
absence of such a policy, and consequently, that welfare increases for both the migrants and 
for those who stay behind in the developing country.
3 We identify an additional channel - 
other than the incentive effect on the acquired quantity of human capital - through which 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Stark et al. (1997), Stark et al. (1998), Stark and Wang (2002), Fan and Stark (2007), Stark 
and Fan (2011), and Stark et al. (2012). 3 
 
controlled  migration  can  increase  social  welfare:  the  chance  of  migrating  influences 
individuals' decisions regarding the type of human capital that they form. It makes it more 
attractive  for  individuals  to  acquire  human  capital  with  a  high  externality  effect  but  low 
private returns. The prospect of migration attached to one type of human capital can revise the 
composition of the human capital acquired in an economy in a socially desirable manner. A 
policy that enables workers of a specific type to migrate can benefit workers of all types. 
 
2. A closed-economy model 
2.1. Setup 
2.1.1. Workers 
Consider a model with one consumption good, the price of which is normalized to unity, and 
two  production  inputs:  engineering,  which  we  denote  by  M   (think  of  mechanical 
engineering), and law,  L. The economy is populated by a continuous set  N  of individuals 
with linear preferences over the consumption good. Prior to employment, each individual 
chooses which type of human capital - engineering or law - to acquire; the set of all the 
individuals  is  thus  partitioned  into  M N   individuals  who  study  engineering,  and  L N  
individuals who study law. 
After the occupational choices are made, individuals of both specializations choose 
how much human capital to acquire. The cost of acquiring  x θ  units of human capital of either 





θ , where  0 K >  measures the difficulty of human capital 
acquisition. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the said cost is the same for both types 
of human capital; relaxing this assumption will change the results that follow quantitatively, 
but not qualitatively. 
2.1.2. Firms 
Competitive firms produce the consumption good by means of a constant returns to scale 
Cobb-Douglas technology, and use labor of both types as inputs of production. Denoting the 
discrete set of firms by I , the production function of a firm i∈I  is 
  ( ) ( )
1
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where  ij N  is the set of workers of type  { , } j M L ∈  hired by firm i,  x θ  is the human capital of 
worker  x, and  [0,1] α ∈  is the output elasticity of engineering. The parameter  A is total 
factor productivity (henceforth TFP) which, we assume, depends on the average knowledge of 













∫ N   (2) 
where  [0,1) η∈  is the elasticity of TFP with respect to the average knowledge of engineering
4 
and  N = N  is the measure of the set  N , that is, the population size.
5 We assume that each 
firm is small enough, and that it treats the total factor productivity as given. 
The timing of events is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The timing of events in the model of the closed economy 
 
As shown in the subsequent analysis, all the individuals of a given occupation acquire 
the same amount of human capital; denote this amount by  M θ  for engineers, and by  L θ  for 
lawyers. This allows us to rewrite (1) and (2), respectively, as 
                                                 
4 We assume that η  does not exceed unity because otherwise the maximization problems analyzed in the paper 
would become convex with no finite solutions. A “modest” value of  1 η <  is empirically quite plausible. 
5 In the analysis that follows we will denote by 
ij N  the measure of a set 
ij N  of workers of type  { , } j M L ∈  
hired by firm i . By 
j N  we will denote the measure of a set 
j N  of workers of type  j . 5 
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 
  (4) 
As follows from a well-known property of the constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function, the number of firms in the market, as well as their size distribution, is 
immaterial for computing the aggregate output and aggregate demand for the two types of 
labor. A corollary of this property is that we can compute the aggregate output by assuming 
that there is only one firm that hires all the workers, and that this firm has the following 
production function: 
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  (5) 
2.2. The social planner's problem 
The social planner seeks to bring to a maximum the aggregate output net of the aggregate cost 
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subject to the size-of-population constraint:  M L N N N + ≤ . 
The first order conditions are 
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From  comparing  (10)  to  (11)  it  follows  that  the  levels  of  human  capital  (say  years  of 
university education) acquired in both occupations are equal to each other:  M L θ θ θ = ≡ ; this 












. Combined with the size-of-population constraint, we get that the 
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Insertion of (13) and (12) into (6) yields 
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  (14) 
From (13) and (14) it follows that per capita welfare (that is, per capita output less the per 
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  (15) 
2.3. The market equilibrium 
2.3.1. The labor market: supply 
The  labor  market  is  characterized  by  the  equilibrium  wages  j w   for  an  efficiency  unit  of 
human capital of type  { , } j M L ∈ . Given the wages, each worker of each type  j  decides how 
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θ = . Therefore, the welfare of a worker of type  j  is 
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θ θ = − =  
Since workers are free to choose their occupation, in equilibrium they enjoy the same 
welfare in both occupations. This means that equilibrium wages must be equal across the two 
occupations 
  M L w w w = ≡   (17) 







θ θ ≡ = ∀   (18) 









=  8 
 
2.3.2. The labor market: demand 
We assume that there is a discrete set  I  of price-taking firms. The firms treat the total factor 
productivity (4) as given. Because of the constant-returns-to-scale production technology and 
perfect  competition,  a  firm  of  any  size  will  make  zero  profit  in  equilibrium,  hence, 
analytically speaking, firm size does not matter. 
Consider a firm  i∈I  that seeks to produce  i Y  units of output at minimal cost; its 
optimization problem is 
  ( )
, min
iM iL
M M iM L L iL N N w N w N θ θ +   (19) 
subject to (cf. (3)) 
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where  ij N ,  { , } j M L ∈  is the number of workers of type  j  hired by firm  i. The first-order 
conditions for this problem are 
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where µ  is the Lagrange multiplier. From the first-order conditions we conclude that the ratio 











  (20) 
Recalling the equilibrium wage equality (17) and human capital equality (18), we conclude 











Given that the total supply of workers is  N , the equilibrium division of labor is 
  M N N α =   (21) 
  (1 ) L N N α = −  9 
 
2.3.3. Equilibrium analysis 
We can now write the firms' aggregate profits  i
i
π ∑ , and due to the assumption of perfect 
competition, set them equal to zero. Recalling the expression for total factor productivity (4), 
as well as (21), we get that 
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where 
1
1 (1 ) C
α η α α α
+ − ≡ − .  By  solving  the  system  of  equations  (18)  and  (23),  we  obtain 
unique solutions for the equilibrium level of human capital θ , the wage  w, and the worker's 
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2.3.4. Free equilibrium versus social optimum 
We compare the social optimum with the free market equilibrium. As a preliminary, it is 
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with strict inequality if and only if  (0,1) η∈ . 
The proofs are in the Appendix. 
We can now establish the following important results. 
Proposition  1.  In  the  free-market  equilibrium,  the  welfare  per  capita,  the  amount  of 
accumulated  human  capital,  and  the  share  of  engineers  in  the  population  are  below  the 
socially desirable level if  (0,1) η∈  and  1 α < . 
Proof. The first part of the Proposition follows from a comparison of (15) and (26), using 
Lemmas 1 and 2. The second part follows from a comparison of (14) and (24), using Lemma 
1. The third part follows directly from a comparison of (12) and (21). □ 
We  next  investigate  how  a  selective  migration  prospect  affects  the  free-market 
equilibrium level of welfare, the accumulated human capital, and the share of engineers in the 
population. 
 
3. The effects of the possibility of migration by engineers 
3.1. The open-economy setup 
We now assume that there is a prospect of migration for engineers, but not for lawyers whose 
human capital is specific to their home country. The timing of events is as follows: first, and 
as before, individuals choose what type of human capital to acquire; second, and again as 
before,  individuals  decide  how  much  human  capital  to  acquire;  third,  a  randomly  chosen 
fraction  [0,1) p∈   of  engineers  migrate.  A  migrant  engineer  earns  a  higher  foreign  wage 
M w w > , where  w is fixed and is exogenous to the model. The non-migrating engineers and 
all the lawyers work in the home country for the prevailing wage rates. Figure 2 illustrates the 




Figure 2: The timing of events in the model with migration 
 
As  before,  in  the  first  step  individuals  choose  an  occupation  that  brings  them  the 
highest  expected  welfare.  In  equilibrium,  they  must  be  indifferent  between  the  two 
occupations. This condition has two implications: first, and as in the closed-economy setting, 
individuals  acquire  the  same  amount  of  human  capital  in  both  occupations;  second,  the 
expected incomes of the individuals in both occupations must be equal to each other and, in 
turn, are equal to  K θ , as in (17) and (18): 
  (1 ) M L pw p w w K θ + − = =   (27) 
where, to recall,  , { , } j w j M L ∈  is the domestic wage of an occupation. 
Recalling that there is a positive externality of the average level of engineering human 
capital  for  firm  productivity,  the  prospect  of  migration  has  three  effects:  first,  it  induces 
individuals to acquire more human capital (a positive effect); second, it increases the ex-ante 
(prior  to  migration)  fraction  of  the  individuals  who  study  engineering  (another  positive 
effect); third, it results in a fraction of engineers leaving the country, potentially decreasing 
the ex-post share of engineers in the non-migrating population (a negative effect). 
Formally,  in  the  presence  of  a  prospect  of  migration,  total  factor  productivity 
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  (28) 12 
 
As in the closed-economy scenario, a firm's problem is to solve (19), which results in 
the same ratio of the firm's demand for the two types of human capital as in (20). At the 
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  (32) 
Next, by setting aggregate profit 
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to zero, substituting the expressions for labor demand (30) and (31), and dividing throughout 
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The  system  of  equations  (27),  (28),  (30)-(32),  and  (33)  completely  describes  the 
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 which, along with (27), we substitute into 
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  (35) 
The only unknown in the latter equation is the level of human capital θ . Note that by setting 
0 p = , we can verify the equivalence of (35) to the free-market closed-economy equilibrium 
(24). 
For the subsequent analysis, it is convenient to use the logarithmic form of (35): 
  1 log ( , ) 0 C F p θ + =   (36) 
where 
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With the arbitrary values of the model parameters, a closed-form solution for an optimal θ  
does not exist. Nonetheless, several properties of the solution can be established. First, to 









 meaningful (that is, positive),  θ  has to exceed a 




θ θ ≥ = .  Second,  it  can  be  shown  that  ( ( ), ) F p p θ = ∞,  whereas 
( , ) F p ∞ = −∞. Therefore, given the continuity of  F , a solution to (36) exists. Third, the first 
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  (37) 
Thus, a solution to (36) exists, and is unique. 
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3.2. The repercussions of opening the economy to migration 
In this section we inquire under what conditions (if any) a small increase in the probability of 
migration  for  engineers  brings  the  domestic  economy  closer  to  the  socially  desirable 
outcomes in terms of human capital accumulation, the share of engineers in the remaining 
population, and the welfare of each population group. 
Proposition 2. An increase of the probability of migration from zero to a small positive value 










  The prospect of migration only of engineers increases human capital accumulation of 
both engineers and lawyers. Since individuals are free to choose their occupation, an increase 
of the expected returns to human capital in engineering must be mirrored by an equivalent 
increase in the returns to human capital in law which, in turn, implies an increased human 
capital accumulation by lawyers. Thus, an increase in  p  brings the levels of human capital in 
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Below, we evaluate the two terms on the right-hand side of (38) at  0 p = . Note that at  0 p = , 
the amount of human capital θ  that individuals acquire is equal to that in the closed-economy 
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Recall from (18) that  1K θ  is the closed-economy wage and thus, by assumption, we have that 












 is always positive. □ 
We next calculate the effect of a marginal increase in the prospect of migration on the 
share of engineers in the remaining population. From the definition of this share, we have that  
 
(1 ) ( , )
( , )
(1 ) ( , ) ( )
M M
M L M L
p N s p
s p
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The full derivative of  ( , ) s p θ  with respect to  p  is 
 







  (41) 
Before computing this full derivative, we establish the following result. 
Lemma 3. In the vicinity of  0 p = , the change of human capital  θ  has no effect on the 
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An  immediate  implication  of  this  result  is  that  in  the  vicinity  of  0 p = ,  the  full 
derivative of  ( , ) s p θ  with respect to  p  is equal to its partial derivative with respect to  p . 
This enables us to state the following proposition. 
Proposition 3. With an increase in the prospect of migration of engineers from  0 p =  to a 
small positive value, their share in the population that remains in the home country increases 
if  (0,1) α ∈ . 
  There are two effects of an increase in  p  on the share of the remaining engineers. The 
ex-post effect is negative: a higher probability  of migration means a lower probability of 
staying in the home country. The ex-ante effect is positive: an increased prospect of migration 
(a prospect of increased earnings) induces more individuals to study engineering. Proposition 
3 states that the ex-ante effect is stronger than the ex-post effect, which means that the higher 
the prospect of migration, the closer the share of engineers in the non-migrating population to 
the socially desirable share. The Proposition is valid only for the interior values of α : with 
0 α =  or with  1 α = , one of the two occupations is virtually non-existent, and thus the share 
of population in a given occupation cannot change. 
Proof. From (41) and Lemma 3, 



































where the latter inequality follows from the assumption that the foreign wage  w is higher 











We now turn to analyze the effects of a marginal increase in the prospect of migration 
on the welfare of all the population groups. Ex-post, after the migration “lottery” has been 
played,  there  are  three  such  groups:  migrating  engineers,  non-migrating  engineers,  and 17 
 
lawyers. From (27), it follows that the three groups are ranked as follows: migrant engineers 
are the most well-off, lawyers are in the middle, and the engineers who stay at home are the 
least well-off. Indeed, migrating engineers (winners of the “lottery”) must be better off than 
non-migrating  engineers;  and  the  expected  payoff  from  acquiring  human  capital  in 
engineering, which is a linear combination of the payoffs of the two groups of engineers, is 
equal to the lawyers' payoff. Below, we analyze the payoff of each group in detail. 





W w θ θ = − ; from (27), it follows that this 




θ . From Proposition 2, we know that  θ  is increasing with  p , and 
therefore so does lawyers' welfare. 













> , we have that in the vicinity of  0 p = , 
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= − > . Therefore, 
engineers that ex-post are able to migrate benefit from an increasing prospect of migration 
since  they  have  an  increased  ex-ante  incentive  to  acquire  human  capital  that  yields  high 
returns abroad. 
The effect of a marginal increase in  p  on the welfare of non-migrating engineers is 
non-trivial, and we next turn to analyze this effect. 
Proposition 4. An increase in the probability of migration from  0 p =  to a small positive 
value increases the welfare of non-migrating engineers if and only if the externality effect of 








  An increasing prospect of migration induces all the individuals to accumulate more 
human  capital,  which  increases  total  factor  productivity  such  that  if  the  inequality  in 
Proposition 4 holds, even the losers of the migration “lottery” are better off compared to how 
they would have fared in the closed economy. 
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 from the proof of Proposition 2, we 
find that the derivative  of the welfare of the non-migrating  engineers  with respect to the 
migration probability is 
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Since  1K θ  is the domestic (ex-ante) wage, we always have that  1 0 w K θ − >  and therefore, 
















If  there  was  no  positive  externality  of  engineering  ( 0 η = ),  (42)  would  have  been 
unambiguously negative: with constant total factor productivity, the losers of the migration 
“lottery” must be worse off ex-post than those who never played the “lottery” to begin with 
(that is, engineers living in a closed economy). On the other hand, if engineering was the only 
productive input ( 1 α = ), the welfare effect of a marginal increase from zero in the migration 19 
 




In a one-sector, two-input model with endogenous human capital formation, one of the two 
inputs of production (engineering) exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, 
while the other (law) does not. We show that a marginal prospect of migration for engineers 
increases human capital accumulation in both sectors (engineering and law), and leads to an 
increase in the number of engineers who remain in the home country. Since these two effects 
move the home economy away from the inefficient free-market equilibrium towards the social 
optimum,  they  are  both  socially  desirable.  We  also  show  that  if  the  externality  effect  of 
engineers  is  sufficiently  powerful,  all  the  individuals  will  be  better  off  when  there  is  a 
prospect  of  migration,  including  the  engineers  who  lose  the  migration  “lottery”  and  the 
individuals who practice law. 
Receiving countries often select the type of professionals that they admit rather than 
open their arms or gates to migrants of all types. When the receiving country accepts, for 
example, only engineers, computer programmers, or natural scientists, the home country need 
not  lose,  either  absolutely  or  in  comparison  with  a  receiving  country  with  an  open-to-all 
migration  policy.  Indeed,  when  the  said  selection  is  tantamount  to  a  small  probability  of 
migration, and the type selected is the one that confers a productive externality in the sending 
country, that country stands to gain. 
In the setting developed in this paper, when the externality effect is powerful enough, 
the  prospect  of  selective  migration  for  a  heterogeneous  workforce  penalizes  neither  the 
workers who, in spite of responding to the opportunity to migrate do not in the end take it up, 
nor the workers for whom there is no such opportunity. In the context of the strong and rising 
interest in the topic of equality of opportunity in modern welfare economics and social choice 
theory (Roemer, 1998, 2002), this latter result is quite telling. The equality of opportunity 
premise is that regardless of type, all members of a society should be allowed to compete on 
equal terms and enjoy the same access to rewarding opportunities for their hard-earned skills. 
The  expansion  of  options  for  individuals  to  choose  and  pursue  is  a  cherished  goal.  A 
configuration in which individuals of only one type have an opportunity to migrate and reap 
higher returns to their acquired skills could thus be deemed orthogonal to the basic tenet of 20 
 
the equality of opportunity concept. This paper presents an example of a case where unequal 




Proof of Lemma 1 
Consider a function 
1 ( ) (1 ) f x x x
α η α + − ≡ − , with  [0,1] x∈ . It is straightforward to show that the 
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if and only if  (0,1) η∈  and  1 α < . ( 0 1 C C =  if  0 η = , or if  1 α = ). □ 
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g x >   for  (0,1) x∈ .  Since  ( ) g x   is  continuously 





>  for any  (0,1) x∈ . 
Using the fact that 
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Upon dividing both sides of the last equation by 
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for any  (0,1) x∈ . □ 23 
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